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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH#
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
KENNETH JAMES MORRELL,
:

Case No. 890031-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant relies on his opening brief, and refers this
Court to that brief for the statements of jurisdiction, issues,
the case, and the facts.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The facts underlying an unrelated robbery have no
bearing on Appellant's intent during the encounter between
Appellant and Mr. Moor.

The prejudicial impact of the admission

of the facts underlying an unrelated robbery and additional
evidence admitted to prove Appellant's guilt by focusing on
criminal character require reversal of Appellant's conviction.
Whether the right is of constitutional or statutory
origin, Appellant's right to present a defense was violated by
the trial court's barring cross-examination bearing directly on
Appellant's defense and the credibility of the adverse witness,
Mr. Moor.

The prejudice resulting from this violation or "abuse

of discretion" requires reversal.
The trial court's ruling admitting evidence concerning
Appellant's post-arrest pre-Miranda silence was incorrect.
1

The

State's provision of a new basis for the admission of this
evidence (Fletcher v. Weir) also fails because, even if Fletcher
v. Weir were applicable in Utah, it does not support the
admission of the evidence in this case.

The sole purpose in

admitting this improper evidence was to lead the jurors to infer
Appellant's guilt.

That purpose was improper; the impact was

prejudicial; reversal is required.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE ROBBERY OF PAUL CHRISTENSEN
HAD NO BEARING ON APPELLANT'S INTENT
DURING THE ENCOUNTER WITH MR. MOOR.
As noted in Point III of Appellant's opening brief,
when the trial court allowed into evidence the facts underlying
Appellant's guilty plea to an unrelated robbery, the trial court
violated numerous rules of evidence: Rule 609 (a guilty plea
prior to sentencing is not a conviction under the rule; robbery
is not per se a crimen falsi; the facts underlying the conviction
are not admissible under the rule); Rule 404 (evidence is not
admissible to prove criminal propensity); Rule 403 (when the
prejudicial impact of evidence outweighs its probative value, the
evidence is excluded).

Focusing on the trial court's failure to

properly analyze the robbery of Paul Christensen under the test
applicable under Utah Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1)# the State
concedes that admission of the robbery was error under that rule.
Appellee's Brief at 33.
The State maintains/ however, that the facts of the
robbery of Mr. Christensen were admissible under Rule of Evidence
2

404, as proof of Appellant's intent.
Contrary to the facts in this case, intent was in issue
in State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194 (Utah App. 1987).

While

Appellant claimed no misunderstanding of the encounter with Mr.
Moor in the instant case, Mr. DeAlo, charged with possession with
intent to distribute cocaine, claimed that he was unaware of the
cocaine hidden in his vehicle.

Icl. at 196. As evidence of Mr.

DeAlo1s intent to possess and distribute the cocaine, the trial
court admitted evidence relating to Mr. DeAlo's apparent
involvement in a large cocaine distribution scheme in California
(a search warrant, supporting affidavit, and dope ledger).

Id.

at 198. Although Mr. DeAlo1s intent was disputed in that case,
this Court explained that the evidence of the California scheme
was not relevant to Mr. DeAlo's intent involved in the cocaine
seized in Utah:
Assuming the documents were introduced to
prove defendant's intent to distribute a
controlled substance, we must examine whether
the documents had any tendency to prove that
intent. Neither the affidavit nor warrant
make any statements even remotely related to
the seizure of the cocaine in Utah....
The probative value of the dope ledger
is also questionable. The prosecution
admitted that the names, codes, and dates on
the dope ledger bore no relation to the
cocaine seized in Utah. The prosecution
claimed, however, the ledger demonstrated
defendant's knowledge of and intent to
participate in a major cocaine distribution
scheme. Even assuming the ledger
demonstrated those facts, it still was not
connected to the cocaine seized in Utah.
The marginal probative value of this
evidence was overwhelmingly outweighed by the
probability of unfair prejudice and confusion
of the issues submitted to the jury, and its
3

admission clearly affected the substantial
rights of the defendant.
Id. at 199.
Even if intent were in issue in this case, Appellant's
robbery of Mr. Christensen had no bearing on his "intent" during
the encounter with Mr. Moor.

Rather, the evidence must have led

the jurors to the desired conclusion: Appellant robbed Mr. Moor
because it was his habit to rob pizza delivery people.

The

admission of the evidence violated Rules of Evidence 404 and 403,
and resulted in Appellant's conviction, which must be reversed.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT'S PREVENTION OF
THE PRESENTATION OF APPELLANT'S DEFENSE
THROUGH CROSS-EXAMINATION OF MR. MOOR
REQUIRES REVERSAL.
As explained in Point I of Appellant's opening brief,

1
The State disavowed any claim that the evidence was
admissible to demonstrate modus operandi. M.H. 27. Indeed, it
was not. See Appellant's opening brief at pages 30-32.
That being the case, what was the function of the
hearsay evidence presented through Officer Wayment that the
telephone used to call Mr. Christensen to the scene of the
robbery, like the telephone used to call Mr. Moor to the scene of
the encounter with Appellant, was not located at the address
given by the telephone caller (T. 2 81-82, 84)? To inform the
jurors once again that the robbery of Mr. Christensen was so
similar to the facts alleged by Mr. Moor, that Appellant must
have robbed Mr. Moor.
Appellant maintains that this evidence was improperly
admitted, for several reasons. See T.2 81-85 (attached as
appendix 1 ) , where defense counsel objected to Officer Wayment's
testimony concerning the telephone calls involving both the
Christensen robbery and the Moor incident (£f. brief of Appellee
at 15, contending that the facts concerning the Moor telephone
call were not objected t o ) , on the grounds of hearsay, lack of
foundation, and lack of relevance. See also pages 10-12 of
Appellant's opening brief, containing the "specious"
confrontation clause argument, absurdly contending that the
reliability of the evidence is a pertinent concern.
4

the trial court violated Appellant's right to confrontation when
it blocked Appellant from asking the State's main witness
questions relating directly to Appellant's defense and to that
witness's credibility.

It was Appellant's defense to the

robbery that he was collecting $45 owed him by Mr. Moor, for some
marijuana Appellant sold Mr. Moor at a party.

Defense counsel

was not allowed to ask Mr. Moor if he may have engaged in the
drug transaction with Appellant, but forgot it due to Mr. Moor's
drug and/or alcohol use.

See T. 43-44, in Appendix 2.

The State argues that this Court should not address the
violation of Appellant's right to confrontation because defense
counsel did not inform the trial court of the constitutional
issue.

Appellee's brief at 19. The trial court never explained

why he chose to block the questions asked by defense counsel
2
(although there was a bench conference (T. 44)), and defense
counsel never stated the obvious on the record:
The right of an accused in a criminal
trial to due process is, in essence, the
right to a fair opportunity to defend
against the State's accusations. The rights
to confront and cross-examine witnesses and
to call witnesses in one's own behalf have
long been recognized as essential to due
process. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the
Court in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273, 92
L.Ed. 682, 68 S.Ct. 299 (1948), identified
these rights as among the minimum essentials
of a fair trial.
"A person's right to
reasonable notice of a charge
against him, and an opportunity to
2
But see State v. Suarez, Case No. 880309-CA (filed May
25, 1990), slip opinion at 3, n.3 (bench conferences should be
recorded).
5

be heard in his defense - a right
to his day in court - are basic in
our system of jurisprudence; and
these rights include, as a
minimum, a right to examine the
witnesses against him, to offer
testimony, and to be represented by
counsel."
Chambers v, Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
Assuming that this Court agrees with the State, that
the trial court was not aware of the legal doctrines governing
its blocking of Appellant's defense, this Court must still
reverse Appellant's conviction on simple evidentiary grounds.
As explained in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284
(1973), when cross-examination is impeded, the "integrity of the
fact-finding process" is called into question.

Thus, prior to

blocking cross-examination, a competing interest must justify
the sacrifice of reliability.

Id., at 295, citing Berger v.

California, 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969).
The competing interest posed by the State in the
instant case is protecting Mr. Moor from embarrassment and
harassment.

Appellee's brief at 22.

Weighing Mr. Moor's hypothetical discomfort (which is
not apparent in the record) against Appellant's conviction (which
resulted, in part, from his inability to present his defense),
the trial court erred in blocking the cross-examination of Mr.
Moor.

See State v. Mitchell, 571 P.2d 1351 (Utah

1977)(reversible error occurred under the old rules of evidence
when the trial court prohibited cross-examination of state's
witness relating to her drug use, which was relevant to her
6

credibility as a witness, and directly relevant to the defense).
III.
THE ADMISSION OF APPELLANT'S
POST-ARREST, PRE-MIRANDA SILENCE
REQUIRES REVERSAL.
As explained in Point II of Appellant's opening brief,
the trial court erred reversibly in admitting evidence that when
Appellant was both in police custody and suspected of crime,
prior to his receipt of Miranda warnings, Appellant was silent
when the police questioned him.

The State responds, arguing that

Appellant was not entitled to a Miranda warning prior to
questioning because he was not under arrest, but was merely an
investigative detainee, and arguing that under Fletcher v. Weir,
Appellant's "post-arrest" silence was admissible to impeach his
3
claim of innocence at trial. Appellee's brief at 24-31.
A. APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO MIRANDA WARNINGS.
The State contends that Officer Miller's question to
Appellant, "What's going on here?", occurred during the
investigation prior to Appellant's being considered a suspect.
The State apparently assumes that the discussion with Mr. Moor
(after which Appellant was considered a suspect) followed the
question to Appellant.

Appellee's brief at 28. Appellant

contends that the question to Appellant followed the discussion
with Mr. Moor.

Appellant's opening brief at 16.

This sequence of events is important because under the
3
It is curious that for purposes of entitlement to
Miranda warnings, Appellant was not under arrest, and yet
his "post-arrest" silence was admissible for impeachment
purposes.
7

Utah Constitution, if Appellant was restrained (the State
concedes this) and suspected of crime, he was entitled to Miranda
warnings.

Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah

1983).

Officer Neeley1s testimony (in appendix 3) concerning
the sequence of events surrounding Appellant's arrest, if read
carefully, supports Appellant's assertion that he was a suspect
prior to Officer Miller's question.

While Officer Neeley claimed

that at some point prior to her conclusion that Appellant was a
suspect, he was an investigative detainee (T.2 11), this
testimony does not contradict other evidence that the police
considered Appellant a suspect prior to Officer Miller's
question.
Officer Neeley was called to the scene to investigate a
fight and a missing pizza driver (T.2 8-9).

It was immediately

after Mr. Moor, "the victim", exited the restaurant that Officer
Neeley considered Appellant a suspect, and she and Officer Miller
took physical custody of Appellant from Mr. Ilov (T.2 9, 11).
Prior to asking Appellant the question, the police stood on both
sides of him, and held his arm behind his back (T.2 9, 10). It
is unclear whether the officers' search of Appellant preceded the
question (T.2 4 ) .
4
Also see T.2 6, where the prosecutor argued that
Appellant was "detained as a suspect", but not formally
arrested; California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125
(1983)("Although the circumstances of each case must certainly
influence a determination of whether a suspect is "in custody"
for purposes of receiving Miranda protection, the ultimate
inquiry is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint
on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal
arrest.").
8

The police apparently felt no need to take such
"investigatory" actions against Mr. Ilov (who was holding
Appellant over a mailbox when the police arrived) or Mr. Moor.
The State's contention that the question, "What's going
on here?" was not interrogation requiring Miranda warnings, but
was merely an investigatory question, should be evaluated by
reference to Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), where
the Court explained the definition of "interrogation":
That is to say, the term "interrogation"
under Miranda refers not only to express
questioning, but also to any words or actions
on the part of the police (other than those
normally attendant to arrest and custody)
that the police should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the suspect. The latter portion of this
definition focuses primarily upon the
perceptions of the suspect, rather than the
intent of the police. This focus reflects
the fact that the Miranda safeguards were
designed to vest a suspect in custody with an
added measure of protection against coercive
police practices, without regard to objective
proof of the underlying intent of the police.
A practice that the police should know is
reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating
response from a suspect thus amounts to
interrogation. But since the police surely
cannot be held accountable for the
unforeseeable results of their words or
actions, the definition of interrogation can
extend only to words or actions on the part
of police officers that they should have
known were reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response.
Id. at 300-302 (emphasis original).
Under the first prong of Innis, there were both express
questioning ("What's going on?") and other actions by the police
used to elicit a response (surrounding Appellant and holding his
9

arm behind his back). See Innis at 302.

Under the second prong

of Innisy the police should have known that the question was
reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response.

See id. at

303.
In short, at the time that Officer Edwards asked
Appellant what was going on, Appellant was physically restrained,
a "suspect", subjected to interrogation, and entitled to a
Miranda warning.

Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah

1983)(decided under Utah Constitution); Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 U.S. 291 (1980)(federal constitution).
B. FLETCHER V. WEIR DOES NOT APPLY.
Pursuant to its duty to promote justice, the State
argues that under Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982)(per
curiam), "post-arrest" silence is admissible to impeach a claim
of innocence at trial.

The argument must be rejected for two

reasons.
1. This theory was not raised below.
The issue before the trial court was Appellant's
entitlement to Miranda warnings:
THE COURT: Do you agree with Ms. Loy
that if, in fact, he had been detained and
was held and knew he could not leave, that
that would be tantamount at that point,
subject to restraint as to require Miranda
warning in regards to any statements that
might be made.
MR. REED: I believe that is an accurate
statement of what the law requires. Your
Honor.
(T.2 7 ) .
The application of Weir and similar doctrines requires
10

foundation analysis that the trial court in the instant case
never considered.

State v. Nott, 669 P.2d 660, 671, 674-675

(Kan. 1983)(prior to admitting evidence of prior silence, a trial
court must determine if the silence can be construed as
inconsistent with trial testimony).
The Weir opinion is by no means accepted by all state
courts as the governing standard, and had the prosecutor sought
to rely on Weir, Appellant would have had the opportunity to
address the application of that decision under the Utah
Constitution.

In the event that this Court finds Weir

applicable, Appellant would like the opportunity for full
briefing under the Utah Constitution.
This Court should not address this argument because it
was raised for the first time on appeal.

See State v. Talbot,

Case No. 880342-CA (filed May 9, 1990), slip opinion at 3.
2. Appellant's silence was consistent with his defense; it had no
impeachment value.
Evidence of post-arrest silence is not admissible to
support an inference of guilt; rather, it is admissible solely to
impeach an inconsistent claim (e.g. that a defendant had
previously told his exculpatory version of the events to the
police).

E.g. State v. Sorrels, 642 P.2d 373, 375-376 (Utah

5 See State v. Davis, 686 P.2d 1143 (Wash.App.
1984)(criticizing Weir); Nelson v. State, 691 P.2d 1056 (Alaska
App. 1984)(Fletcher v. Weir is rejected under state
constitution). Also see State v. Nott, 669 P.2d 660 (Kan
1983)(majority and dissenting opinion discuss confused federal
interpretations of the right against self-incrimination and
impeachment use of prior silence).
11

1982).

Thus, prior to the admission of such evidence, a court

must make a foundational inquiry to determine whether the
evidence has impeachment value.

State v. Nott, 669 P.2d 660,

671, 674-675 (Kan. 1983).
Appellant's silence has no impeachment value in this
case.

It is apparently the State's contention that Appellant,

surrounded and held by police, should have responded to the
question, "What's going on here?", by telling the officers the
same exculpatory version of facts he told the jurors at trial,
and that his failure to exculpate himself when the police asked
him this question demonstrates that his defense was fabricated.
Appellee's brief at 30-31.
As if.
"Gee Officers, I'm sure glad you showed up.
I've been trying my best to collect the $45
Mr. Moor owes me from a previous marijuana
transaction, but he refuses to pay me in
full, the little scamp. Can you help me
out?"
Appellant's silence was consistent with his defense.
Because Appellant's silence had no impeachment value, it was not
admissible under Fletcher v. Weir.
The admission of this improper evidence was prejudicial
and requires reversal.
CONCLUSION
Because Appellant's conviction resulted from the
improper admission of prejudicial evidence, this Court should
reverse the conviction.

12
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APPENDIX 1
Officer Wayment's Testimony
Concerning Telephone Calls in
Moor Encounter and Christensen Robbery

Q

Whose case is that?

A

Assigned to me for follow-up.

Q

Have you done investigation in this case?

A

Yes.

Q

As part of your investigation, have you

reviewed the police reports that were prepared in that
case?
A

Yes.

Q

Tell us what is the basic nature of this case?

A

It was reported as a robbery.
MS. LOY:

Objection, Your Honor.

I am not sure

it is too general.
THE COURT: Sustained, too general.
Q

(By Mr. Reed) With regard to this case, are you

aware of any telephone numbers that were given to police
officers with regard to information and phone calls made
to Ambassador Pizza?
A

Yes.

Q

What phone number was given as part of that

investigation?
MS. LOY:

Objection, hearsay.

MR. REED: Your Honor, I think —
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS:

Phone number that was given:

532-8187.
81

Q

(By Mr. Reed) Have you had an opportunity to

further investigate the location of that phone, if it
exists?
A

Yes.

Q

And where is that phone located?

A

It is located outside the Smith's Food Store at

328 South 900 West.
Q

Is that the phone number that was given by the

caller who gave the address of 313 Genessee?
A

Yes.

Q

Does that phone number, in fact, corns back to

813 Genessee?
A

No.

Q

Have you reviewed any other oases with regard

to similar types of instances?
A

Yes.
MS. LOY:

Objection, relevance.

THE COURT:
Q

Overruled.

(By Mr. Reed) Have you reviewed reports in a'

case involving a victim called Paul Christensen?
A

Yes.

Q

And as part of that review, were you able to

obtain a telephone number that was used in that case?
A

Yes.

Q

And the telephone number used in that case,
32

could you tell us what thai: was?
MS. LOY:

Objection, lack of foundation,

hearsay.
THE COURT: Well, lay a foundation where he is
getting that information from.
Q

(By Mr. Reed) From where did you obtain this

information?
A

From the police report.

Q

Are those reports regularly prepared by

officers in your office?
A

Yes.

Q

And is that part of your duties in your office?

A

Yes.

Q

And from that police report, what number did

you obtain?
MS. LOY:

Objection, foundation and hearsay.

'THE COURT: Overruled.
Q

(By Mr. Reed) What number did you obtain?

A

466-0348.

Q

And have you further investigated the location

of that number, if any?
A

That number comes back not located.

Q

And what does that mean?

A

There was no record of that phone number

listed.
83

Q

Did you, as a result of that investigate any

other numbers?
A

Yes.

0

What number did you investigate?

A

466-0438.

Q

Why did you choose to investigate thai: number,

as well?
A

The report previously mentioned referred that

"he call was made in the area of 13th South and Sth East.
Q

Based upon that information', what if any

investigation did you do?
A

I went to 13th South 9th East, to the 7-11,

which is located on the northeast corner of thar
intersection.

There are two pay phones there. One

number was 466-0438.
Q

How does that number differ from the first :ne?

A

It's just simply the four and the thre-r are

reversed.
Q

Does the number 466-0348 come back to an

address at 1127 South Windsor?
A

No.

Q

Have you done any further investigation at my

request today in this case?
A

Yes.

Q

What investigation have you done?
34

A

You requested me to go to the area of 2nd South

*nd 3th East and determine if there was any phones at
that location.
Q

Did you do so?

A

Yes.

Q

What did you find?

A

There was a drive-up phone booth accessible by

car at the northeast: corner of 8th South —

excuse me,

8th East, 2nd South.
MR. REED:

Thank you.

Mo further questions,

CROSS EXAMINATION
EY MS. LOY:
Q

Mr. Wayinent, were you involved initially in the

follow-up investigation of the case involving
Mr. Christensen?
A

No.

"0

You only looked at that later?

A

Yes.

Q

Officer in this case, in your investigation of

this robbery of Matthew Moor that has been alleged, did
you have occasion to see any physical evidence?

Have you

reviewed any physical objects that have been indicated to
you as evidence?
A

No.
35

APPENDIX 2
Limited Cross-Examination
of Mr. Moor

A

Scott Perry, no.

Q

You know any man named Scott who lives in the

West Valley area?
A

No, I don't.

Q

Have you ever been to a party on the east side

of Salt Lake in the area of Trolley Square where you
might have met Mr. Morrell and don't remember
specifically?
A

Well, there have been parties that I have been

to where I don't remember anything.

So, I don't know. I

don't remember ever having seen Mr. Morrell, ever.
Q

When you say sometimes you don't remember

anything after being to a party, would that be because of
alcohol and drug use?
MR. REED:

Objection, Your Honor, I don't see

where we are going with this.
THE COURT:

State the question again.

MS. LOY: Would the reason he has stated that
be because of alcohol and drug use?

Q

MR. REED:

Object to the question.

THE COURT:

Objection sustained.

(By Ms. Loy) Mr. Moor, have you ever obtained

marijuana from Ken Morrell?
MR. REED:

Objection, Your Honor.

He has

already said he doesn't know Mr. Morrell.
43

1
2

THE COURT:
Q

Sustained.

(By Ms. Loy) Mr. Moor, is it possible that you

3

have met Mr. Morrell at a party and you do not know

4

remember him, meeting him at a party because of some

5

reason?

6
7

MR. REED:

Your Honor, this has been asked and

answered.

8

MS. LOY:

9

THE COURT:

10

MR. REED:

12

THE COURT:

14

Overruled.

I will let her pursue

this more.

11

13

This is in a different form.

May I reserve the objection?
Make your objections as they appear

on the record.
Q

(By Ms. Loy) Mr. Moor, is it possible that you

15

met Mr. Morrell at a party at some time in your past and

16

do not know remember because you have for some reason not

17

remembered what occurred at a-past party?

18 I
19

THE COURT:

22

Both of you

approach the bench.

20
21

Wait a minute.

(Off the record discussion between Court and
counsel.)
Q

(By Ms. Loy) Mr. Moor, you indicated you took

23

some money out of your pocket and handed it to

24

Mr. Morrell; is that right?

25

A

Yes.
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APPENDIX 3
Officer Neeley's Testimony
Concerning Officer Neeley's
Post-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Question
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Let the record

::

-r
i-

show the jury is in

its place in the .jury box and we are ready to proceed.
MS. LOY:

Thank you. Your Honor.

We would call

Officer Meeley to the stand.
OFFICER SUSAN NEELEY
Called as a witness on behalf of the defendant, after
having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified
as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. LOY:
Q

Officer, would you please state your full name

for the record and spell your last name.
A

Susan Meeley, N-e-e-I-e-y.

Q

And where are you employed?

A

Salt Lake City Police Department.

Q

Were you employed there on September 4th of

1988?
A

I was.

Q

On that date in the late evening or early

morning hours of the next day, did you have occasion to
be involved in an apprehension of Kenneth Morrell?
A

I did.

Q

And can you tell the jury where you went on
1

That duty0
A

Yes.

I wenr TO approximately 190'" Jouth .:tate

Street in front of the Sccnecutter.
Q

And when you arrived there, what iid you

observe as far as Mr. Morreli and his position?
A

There was a witness that had him bent :ver. I

believe it was a mailbox or something at about that
height, with his arm behind his back, .just holding him.
Q

Was Mr. Morreli restrained?

A

Yes.

Q

Who else was present as far r.s law enforcement

officers?
A

Officer Lynn Miller and I arrived about -he

same time.
0

And did anyone else arrive?

A

Shortly after, a couple of other officers

arrived:

Officers Aiired and Hendri::.

Q

Did you have occasion to search Mr. Worrell?

A

I did not sear?:: him.

Q

Did you have occasion to observe whether anyone

else searched him?
A

Officer Miller had him pat down.

0

Did you observe the patdcwn?

A

Yes.

0

And where was that done?

A

In front of the Sconecutter.

Q

Did you see when that was cone \v. re.-ar.ion ~o

your arrival?
A

It happened after Officers Allred. Hendri::,

Miller and I had arrived.
Q

And had Mr. Worrell been taken awav from the

mailbox area when the patdown was done?
A
time.

I believe he was in front of my oar at that
So, yes, he had been.

Q

And how much time had passed from when von

arrived to the time of the patdown?
A

I can't recall.

Q

Was it pretty quick?

A

Yes, I would say so.

Q

And when you observed that patdown, did you

observe any objects removed from Mr. Morrsil's person?
A

Not that I recall.

0

Did you see any objects in zhe area of this

apprehension?
A

Yes.

Q

Did you observe anyone else to have an object

that they found in the investigation?
A

No.

Q

And did you participate in any further

searches?
3

A

No.

'')

Did you have occasion to interview Mr. I lev and

Mr. Moor?
A

Yes, I talked to Mr. Moor.

0

Did Mr. Moor indicate to you anything about

what had occurred with the money that he alleged was
taken from him?
A

After it was taken?

Q

Yes.

A

No, 1 am not aware of what happened tT<n

money.
MS. LOY:

No further questions.
CROSS EXAMINATION

3Y MR. REED:
0

Officer Meeley, what is the purpose of a

patdown?
A

To establish if the suspect, has any weapons.

0

Is that done at the time of an arrest.?

A

No, not necessarily.

It is done when we talk

to anybody that we feel might be carrying a weapon.

It

is for the safety of the suspect plus ourselves.
0

So, you are really not looking f:r anything?

You are .just trying to make sure that the suspect has no
weapons?
A

Right.

0

Did you arrest Mr. Morreil in this case?

A

I did no:.

Q

Did you see Mr. Morreil be arrested?

A

Yes.

0

And who arrested?

A

Officer Alired.

Q

And when did that occur in relationship to your

arrival on the scene?
A

As far as time, I am not really sure.

0

At anytime prior to Mr. Morreil'- arrest:, did

me make any statements to you?
MS. LOY: Objection, Your Honor, improper
comment.
THE COURT:

Come to the bench.

(Off the record discussion between Court and
counsel.)

THE COURT:

We will have the bailiff rake the

jury out to the jury room.

Ladies and gentlemen, we have

a little legal matter we have to discuss for a few
moments.

(Pause)
Let the record show the jury has now left the

courtroom.

And, Ms. Ley.

MS. LOY:

Your Honor, my objection was stated,

I believe, that the question asked for an improper
comment upon my client's silence at the time he was in

custody, although the answer ~f the officer was that he
was net vet arrested.

Her previous "estimcnv \nctiratec:

that he was restrained by a civilian.
^nen patted him down.

""hey arrived and

It appears without further

foundation that it was a comment upon his silence upon
arrest, and that is why I am objecting.
THE COURT: Mr. Reed.
MR. REED:

Your Honor, it is -he ::rri':

position that the officer arrived pursuant to a call and
was conducting an investigation and Mr. >*orreIi was
detained as a suspect, but was not, in fact. ;r under !\nv
legal pretense under arrest until the time that it was
determined that he might have committed a felcny offense,
and at the time the probable cause determination was made
by the officer and Officer Allred made the arrest.

It is

the State's position that although no statements w^re
made by Mr. Morreii "o any officer, that "hat _•?
something that is admissible as evidence as ~^ what his
state ~>f mind was at the rime of his arrest, and the
absence of any explanation for his behavior, which is
part of the contention of his defense that that was not a
robbery: this was a collection of a debt.
I think the officer's statement that no preMiranda statements were made would be a relevant issue
with regard to the defendant's state of mind.

Would not
6

:e m violation cf his Fifth Menanient ngnt ~o regain
-ilent.

There was no prooab^e : ause to -rrest - le

suspect until that determination was maae casea n»::n tie
interview of tne witnesses at tne scene.
THE COURT: Ms. lev.
MS. L3Y:

Your Honor. I think ^hat trerr.ars ~r.is

ruling needs to be based in part upon further factual
^ases.

That would be wnether or not Mr. Morreil cas euer

free to leave or wnether ne was restrained at a-. ~ lines
"y ^he ctficers. if ttiey ""ooi-i rusted'' t: Dm tr^ ~**ili?r
and restrained his freedom to leave.
would be m

Then, Z think he

custody and his custodial silence is

something he has a right to have not commented ucrn.
MR. REED:

I think the statement. Your Honor,

is something similar to the difference between stct ~nd
frisk, or detention for purposes cf investigatirn. and a
letention for purposes of arrest. at whi*-h ~ime ^ne Fifth
Amendment attaches.
THE COURT: Do you agree with Ms. Lev -.ct if.
m

fact, he had been detained and was held and knew he

^ould not leave, that that would be tantamount at that
point, subject + o restraint as tz require Miranda warning
in regards to any statements that might be made.
MR. REED:

I believe that is an accurate

statement of what the law requires. Your Honor.
/

THE COURT:
this point.

I don'- have enough informarion at

You will have to question tnis witness

further in this regard without the jury here and let'3
hear it.

Find out exactly where he was and —

0

(By Mr. Reed) Do you recall where you were when

you got this call?
A

Where I was?

Q

Hh-huh.

A

Exactly, I don't recall.

Q

Ycu recall what hind of r notificatim vcu *"t

and how you received that?
A

Yeah.

The first call that came in there were

two separate calls.
fight.

The first call was that there waa a

I don't recall if it was in the Sconecutter cr

.just in front of the Sconecutter. While I was en route
the second call came in and said it was a pizza driver
and so knowing that we had a pizza driver missing.
assumed it was rhe ?ne that was missma.
0

Was the pizza driver said to be at the same

location as the fight?
A

Yes.

Q

When you arrived, tell us once again what you

observed?
A

Okay.

Mr. Morrell was bent over either a

mailbox or something of that height in front of the

Sconecutter.

And Ivan, one of the witnesses, had one of

his arms behind his back holding him r.here.
Q

Did you see any other persons in the immediate

vicinity?
A

There was a cab driver standing r.here.

Then

when I arrived, the victim came out of the Sconecutter,
along with some other people and I don't recall if there
were two or one or even who they were.
Q

And did you take custody of Mr. Mcrreil at that

:?
A

Officer Miller went to one side of him and I

went to the other side.
0

And where did you take him from?

A

We .just held him at that position.

Q

Did Mr. Ilov let go of him at that r.ime?

A

Yes.

Q

Did you advise Mr. Morrel'l of anything at that

point?
A

Did you say anything to him?
Mo.

As I recall. Officer Miller asked him what

was going on.
0

Was there any response to that question?

A

No.

Q

Was there any other questions asked of him?

A

Not that I heard.

Q

And from that Location was Mr. Morrell taken by

you anywhere else?
A

Mo.

Officer Miller pretty rvuch hana-ed him a*

"Hat point.
Q

Where was +*he defendant when he was arrested by

Officer Allred?
A

I am not really sure.

Officer Miller —

I know we took him.

I was talking to the victim.

He was

taken from the point where we released Ivan end he was
Taken to the side of my car, to the front of IT.
MR. REED:

Very well.

Your Kcncr, : -hink that

is all I can estaolish with this officer.
THE COURT:

Ms. Loy.
EXAMINATION

3Y MS. LOY:
Q

Officer, was Mr. Morreil free to leave as you

and Officer Miller stood there and Officer Miller asked
what was going en?
A

Mo.

Q

How was he restrained?

A

He was just held there with his hand behind his

back.
Q

Are you saying there was physical force holding

him there?
A

Officer Miller was holding him, yes.

Q

Was he ever after that point released from
10

police custody?
A

No.
MS. LOY:

I have nothing further on that.
EXAMINATION

BY MR. REED:
0

Do you have an opinion as to when he became a

suspect in any criminal activity?
A

Yes, I do.

Q

When did that, occur?

A

He was a suspect when the victim came out of

the Sconecutter and there was a little bit of
conversation between he and myself.

And I asked him if

this was the suspect and he said yes.

At that point he

was in my eyes a suspect.
Q

And so, even though prior to that he was

detained, he was not a suspect of any criminal activity?

on.

A

Not at that point.

Q

How would you characterize that detention then?

A

Mainly because we didn't know what was going

When someone is being held like that, we have to

find out all of the facts.
Q

Was that done for the purposes of

investigation?
A

Yes.

Q

Was it done to determine whether or not a crime
11

may nave been committed?
A

Yes.
MR. REED:

Nothing further. Your Honor.

THE COURT:

I am going to allow up to that:

point only, the question that was asked, ana I suspect
the response will be silence.
MR. REED:

I anticipate it. That is correct.

Your Honor.
THE COURT:
MS. ICY:

I will allow that.

Will the Court r.ote my objections, my

continuing objection to that?
THE COURT:
is on the record.

Yes, you have already objected.

It

Bring the jury back.

(The jury was returned to the courtroom.
THE COURT:

The objection is overruled and you

may proceed.
MR. REED:

Your Honor, if I may withdraw -he

previous question and lay some foundation.
CROSS EXAMINATION CONTINUED
3Y MR. REED:
0

How long were you in the immediate presence zi

Mr. Morrell?
A

Altogether, maybe 10, 15 minutes.

Q

And where did you first come into his presence?

A

In front of the Sconecutter on State Street.
1 •?

Q

Was there anyone else there with you and ne?

A

Officer Miller.

Q

How long —

Well, during the time that you were

with Mr. Morreil at that point, did he make any
statements to you about what had happened?

on.

A

No.

Q

Was he asked what had happened?

A

Yes. Officer Miller asked him what was going

There was no response.
MR. REED:

No further questions.

THE COURT:

Ms. Loy.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. LOY:
Q

Officer, when you first arrived and Mr. Ilov

had Mr. Morreil by the mailbox, what is the first action
the officers took toward Mr. Morreil?
A

Officer Miller went to one .^ide and I went to.

the other side.

Officer Miller took the arm ^he witness

had behind his back and kept him in that position.
9

And from that point on, was Mr. Morreil being

held by the police?
A

Yes.
MS. LOY:
MR. REED:

Nothing further.
No further questions, Your Honor,

(Witness excused-)

